Abstract-Perfect secrecy describes cases where an adversary cannot learn anything about the secret beyond its prior distribution. A classical result by Shannon shows that a necessary condition for perfect secrecy is that the adversary should not be able to eliminate any of the possible secrets. In this paper we answer the following fundamental question: What is the lowest leakage of information that can be achieved when some of the secrets have to be eliminated? We address this question by deriving the minimum leakage in closed-form, and explicitly providing "universally optimal" randomized strategies, in the sense that they guarantee the minimum leakage irrespective of the measure of entropy used to quantify the leakage. We then introduce a generalization of Rényi family of asymmetric measures of leakage which generalizes the g-leakage and show that a slight modification of our strategies are optimal with respect to an important class of such measures. Subsequently, we show that our schemes constitute the Nash Equilibria of closely related two-person zero sum games. This game perspective provides implicit solutions for a wider set of structural constraints and asymmetric entropies. Finally we demonstrate how this work can also be seen as designing a universally optimal channel given a specified prior.
I. INTRODUCTION
It is increasingly accepted that in many settings like side channels and database queries, the quantification of leakage of confidential information is essential. In recent years considerable progress has been made in the field of quantitative information flow both on the theory and applications, e.g. [1] - [4] . Particularly important for the field are advances on fundamental security guarantees of leakage measures (what security can be achieved with each measure) and robust techniques and results (how much a technique or result is valid across different notions of leakage).
This work contributes to both leakage guarantees and robustness in that it investigates channels which are optimal, in the sense of guaranteeing minimum leakage, for all possible notions of leakage. In this context, by "channel" we mean a probabilistic system where for each secret, there is a probability distribution over the behaviors or states that can be observed by an adversary.
In its essence, the aim of this paper is to investigate the concept of relative perfect secrecy. This is inspired by the Shannon perfect secrecy theorem [5] , which establishes that a "perfect" encryption scheme must in part be such that an adversary cannot eliminate any secret key by observing the system (see also [6, A.1] in the context of "private information retrieval"). We study here the case where perfect secrecy is not possible, in particular, when the operational constraints on the system are such that each observation allows the attacker to eliminate a number of possible secrets. As real world examples of such constraints, we can mention timing observations which allow the attacker to eliminate certain keys, or Geo-location privacy where some geographic locations are impossible given the observations, or in private querying when not the entire database but a portion of it is downloaded, or when some but not all features of a device/browser can be suppressed against fingerprinting. In the most basic setup, we consider a system with n possible secrets with a given distribution, where each observation on the system allows elimination of n − k possible secrets. We then ask the question: Is there an "optimal" channel given these constraints, i.e., a channel with minimum leakage?
Our presentation uses the notion of cloaks. A cloaking scheme is a non-cryptographic method of hiding secrets by conflating them with larger sets of possibilities, potentially employing randomization. Using this notion, perfect secrecy is achieved only when the cloaks are the entire secret space.
A simple example of cloaking comes from the famous Monty Hall problem, where there are multiple closed doors behind one of which is the prize, i.e., the secret. The player makes an initial guess, after which the game host has to open one empty door, thus eliminating one possible secret, but it should not be the player's initial choice if that happens to be empty. The cloak is then the set of the remaining closed doors, since each can harbor the secret. The game host acts as a channel. The famously tricky question 1 of "should the player revise her initial guess?" can be put as: "does this channel leak?". That the player should change their initial guess is indeed because the channel leaks information.
A challenging problem in investigating optimal channels is that there are several notions of information leakage, e.g., Shannon based [7] , Min Entropy based [8] , Bayesian [9] and g-leakage [10] and they have largely incomparable behavior. So there is no a priori reason why the notion of optimality should be robust. Moreover the few robustness results in the field have been hard to prove (e.g. the proof 1 It is said that Paul Erdős at first thought the player should not switch.
of the Coriaceous Conjecture [11] ). The universal optimality results in this paper are hence non-trivial both in their meaning and in their proof, and they extend the toolkit of robust methods and results in the field.
The focus of this work is foundational. In particular, the list of our contributions is as follows:
Road-map and Contributions: First, we formalize the problem of minimizing the information leakage given a prior distribution of the secret and a cap on the size of the cloaks, where the information leakage is quantified as the difference between the prior and posterior uncertainties of an adversary for a generic entropy measure ( §II). In §III, we express and prove our main result (Thm. 1) , that is, we provide the lowest achievable leakage across all (potentially probabilistic) cloaking strategies in closed form. We explicitly construct randomized strategies that achieve this information theoretical bound, and establish that they are universally optimal, in that they achieve minimum leakage with respect to any choice of entropy measure that satisfies three mild conditions: core-concavity (which we define), symmetry and expansiblity. Next, in §IV, we consider nonsymmetric (gain-based) entropies, introduce a generalization of g-entropy and g-leakage, and establish a natural extension of our main result to this class of entropies (Thm.2) for "diagonal" gain matrices. In §V, we make a connection between designing minimum leakage channels and 2-playerzero-sum games with respect to g-leakage, which enables us to develop a Linear Program (LP) that produces the optimal strategies for any secret-dependent cloaking constraints and any gain function g. Finally, in §VI, we numerically investigate the effect of the maximum allowable size of the cloaks, the choice of the entropy, comparison with the baseline of uniform randomization, and the effect of the adversary's knowledge of the true prior distribution.
Our proofs follow non-trivial techniques that we believe will add to the theoretical toolbox of the research community. Despite the theoretical nature of this work, we envisage possible applications of our results in fields such as side channels countermeasures in the style of bucketing [12] , [13] , in privacy preserving mechanisms like crowdbased anonymity protocols [14] , (Geo)-location privacy [15] , [16] , or obfuscation-based web searching [17] , etc. Detailed investigation of these connections and potential practical implementations will be part of our future work.
Related Literature: Our notions of leakage have been the subject of many works in the past decade. These works mostly use Shannon (e.g. [7] ), Min Entropy (e.g. [8] ) and Bayes risk [9] . More recent works [4] , [10] introduce the notion of g-leakage in order to model leakage scenarios that are not satisfactorily modeled using standard entropic measures of leakage. Our results apply to all these approaches.
The leakage ordering has been the subject of robustness analysis in several works e.g. [11] , [18] . These works are quite different in nature from our work: here, we design a channel given a prior on the secret; there, the channel is given and the ordering is over all possible priors.
Information-theoretic relaxation of the absolute-privacy through cloaking is also investigated in [19] in the context of Internet search engines. The paper however does not quantify the leakage and provides only a lower-bound on the posterior entropy. Also, the proposed policies are heuristic and no claim or quantification of optimality is made.
There has been little work relating quantitative information flow and game theory. Few exceptions are [20] - [22] . In [20] optimal protection against timing attacks is derived as an equilibrium in a 2-player game against an adversary. There, optimality is with respect to cryptographic computations and their key results are in terms of bounds on the probability of key recovery in terms of the computational and measurement limits of an adversary. [21] formalizes the privacy-vs-utility trade-offs in the context of Geo-location privacy as a game of inference against an attacker, and presents an implicit framework based on LP for derivation of the Stackelberg strategies. It does not however provide the strategies in closed-form nor does it consider robustness. [22] considers a guessing game where the defender has a publicly known "uneven" parametric preference over the secrets but gets to choose its distribution. In general there has been little work on quantifying information flow in interactive systems and strategic behavior. Some notable exceptions are the works of [23] - [25] . None of these works however is game theoretical in nature nor seems to fit the context of channel design as the channel is typically a given.
Non-cryptographic schemes are also investigated in the context of secret sharing and key-distribution [26] , but in such scenarios, the goal is to hide a secret from a third party (e.g. eavesdropper), while in our setting, there is only one system vs. an adversary, and no "communication" of information is intended.
II. MODEL
Let the random variable θ represent the secret. It can take one of the n possibilities from the (discrete finite) set Θ := {θ 1 , . . . , θ n }. Secrets are generated independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) over time, according to the (categorical) distribution P , that is, at each instance and irrespective of the past history, Pr(θ = θ i ) = P (θ i ) := p i . Whenever not ambiguous, we will only refer to a secret by its index. Without loss of generality, assume supp(P ) = Θ, i.e., p i > 0, ∀i. Also, without loss of generality, assume p i 's are in descending order, i.e., p 1 ≥ . . . ≥ p n . 2 We make a worst-case assumption about the adversaries: that they know the true distribution according to which the secrets are generated. 3 That is, we take P to be the prior belief of the adversary about the secret, hence we will simply refer to P as the prior. 4 The defender, observing the (realization of the) secret, chooses a cloak M to submit. A cloak is a subset of the secrets including the actual one that a secret can conflate with. 5 As we noted before, in the absence of any restriction on the choice of the cloak, the best trivial cloak is the entire secret space, but in practice, the choice of the cloak is restricted. Let the set of permissible cloaks given secret realization θ be denoted by M(θ). The minimal requirement on any M ∈ M(θ) is that θ ∈ M : the cloak must include the secret itself. One may also add the following logical constraint: a permissible cloak for a secret should also be permissible for all the secrets in that cloak, since otherwise, the secret could not really conflate with all of them. Formally, ∀θ ∈ Θ:
. The action space of the defender is hence M := ∪ θ∈Θ M(θ). Up to §V, we consider a size-capped cloaking constraint, specifically, each cloak is restricted to have at most k elements, where
We will use the following toy example to clarify the concepts: Suppose the secret space is Θ = {1, 2, 3} with the prior distribution of P = (5/9, 3/9, 1/9), and the cloaks are limited to at most k = 2 elements. Then the set of feasible cloaks for secret 1 is M(1) = {{1}, {1, 2}, {1, 3}}, and the set of all feasible cloaks is
A deterministic cloaking strategy of the defender, denoted by d, is an assignment of a permissible cloak to each of the secrets. Specifically, the space of the deterministic cloaking strategies of the defender is D := {d : Θ → M s.t. d(θ) ∈ M(θ), ∀θ ∈ Θ}. An adversary observes the cloak M and updates his belief about the distribution of the secret.
The defender may incorporate randomness in her cloaking strategy, as, intuitively, this would increase the uncertainty of the adversary. A randomized (cloaking) strategy, which we designate by δ, assigns a probability distribution over the set of permissible cloaks for each secret. Specifically, the space of randomized cloaking strategies is D := {δ : Θ → ΔM s.t. ∀θ ∈ Θ, supp(δ(θ)) ⊆ M(θ)}, where ΔM represents the set of all probability distributions over M. We use the notation δ(M ; θ) to designate the probability at which, under the randomized strategy of δ, the defender chooses cloak M when her secret is θ. Using this notation, the space of randomized cloaking strategies can be specified 3 The fact that this is a worst-case assumption for the defender (hence provides stronger leakage guarantees) is closely related to results such as the Gibbs' inequality, or equivalently, the positivity of the KL divergence. 4 Adversaries may be able to learn the distribution of the secrets e.g. by observing a long enough history of the system or its simulation. 5 Each cloak is a "set", hence, any information associated with the order of a cloak's elements (if any) should be eliminated, e.g., by always producing a lexicographical order, or uniformly randomizing its permutation.
by the following two conditions:
Referring to our toy example, an instance of a deterministic cloaking strategy is: {1 → {1, 2}, 2 → {1, 2}, 3 → {1, 3}}, and an example of a randomized strategy can be:
Clearly, any deterministic strategy can be represented as a randomized strategy as well, with degenerate distributions.
Connection between Cloaking Strategies and Channels: A channel is defined as a triple (X, Y, C) where X is the (finite) set of secrets (inputs), Y is the (finite) set of observables, and C is the |X| × |Y | "channel matrix" whose entries are the conditional probabilities for each observable given each secret, that is, C[x, y] = Pr(Y = y|X = x) (hence, all entries are positive and each row adds up to one).
We can hence interpret a cloaking strategy as a channel: X is the set of secrets Θ, Y is the set of cloaks M(θ), and the channel matrix is constructed as
Inversely, a channel can be interpreted as a cloaking strategy of size k by considering the observables' preimages. In terms of the channel matrix the pre-image of an observable is {θ|C[θ, M ] > 0}, i.e. the non-zero elements in the column corresponding to the observable. Given a channel we can associate a cloaking strategy of maximum size k if:
1) pre-image of any observable has less than k elements; 7 2) no two observables have the same pre-image. For a channel satisfying the above properties, we can associate each observable with a cloak that is its pre-image. At the end of this section (Prop. 1), we establish that the search for (leakage-)optimal channels can be restricted to those with non-colliding pre-images. Hence, our optimal cloaking strategies are also optimal channels with equivalent pre-image constraint of (1) without the requirement of (2) .
Notice that in most works in Quantitative Information Flow the channel is given. The problem tackled in this paper is different: we are given a prior on the secret and a structural constraint and we are tasked with designing a channel which is optimal in the sense of leaking as little as possible.
Entropies: The objective of the defender is to be able to interact while leaking the least information about the secret to the adversary. To quantify the expected leakage of information, we need a measure of adversary's ambiguity about the secret, to be compared before and after the interaction. Entropy measures serve this purpose, each with a particular operational significance. Here, we introduce the entropies that we consider in the first part of our paper.
Let H[θ] := H(P ) denote the entropy of the random variable θ with probability distribution P , where the entropy function H is from the set of (discrete) probability distributions to the real numbers. In our setting, H[θ] is a measure of the prior uncertainty of the adversary about the secret. We consider a general entropy function H that only needs to satisfy the following conditions:
• Symmetry. H(P ) is invariant under permutations of p 1 , . . . , p n . In other words, the entropy depends only on the probability distribution of a random variable, and not on the specific labeling of them.
• Expansibility. Enlarging the secret space by adding zero probability secrets ("expansion" by zero components) should not change the entropy.
• Core-Concavity. 8 We call H(P ) core-concave if it can be written as H(P ) = η(F (P )), where η : R → R is a non-constant function on real numbers, F is a scalar function on probability distributions, and we have:
Note that since η is just a non-constant univariate function, the symmetry and expansibility of H simply translate to F and vice versa. The above conditions are not restrictive. Virtually, all well-known entropy measures, some of which we will discuss later, satisfy them all. A notable exception is the gain-based entropies where the symmetry property may not hold. We will return to such entropies in §IV.
The symmetry and core-concavity properties together have an intuitive implication: that the distributions that are "closer to uniform" represent a higher entropy. To make this formal, we next overview the concepts of majorization and Schur-concavity. First, some preliminaries: for a vector a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ R n , let a ↓ = (a [1] , . . . , a [n] ) denote a vector with the same elements but sorted in descending order, that is, a ↓ (i) = a [i] represents the i'th-largest element of a. For a, b ∈ R n , we denote a b and say a majorizes b (or b is majorized or dominated by a) iff:
A Schur-convex function is defined likewise where the last inequality is flipped. A basic result in convex analysis (see e.g. [27, Prop. 3 
.C.2])
states that Any function that is symmetric and concave (convex, resp.) is also Schur-concave (Schur-convex, resp.). Therefore, symmetry and core-concavity conditions imply that our entropy functions are Schur-concave as well.
Some notable examples of the frequently used entropies with practical interpretations are listed below. Note that all of these example entropy functions satisfy the symmetry, expansibility, and core-concavity properties:
• 1-Guess-Error-Probability. H(P ) = 1 − p [1] , which is the probability of failure of an adversary that gets to make one (optimal) guess about the secret. This measure is closely related to the more well-known MinEntropy, where H(P ) = − log p [1] .
• l-Guess-Error-Probability.
, which is the probability of failure of an adversary that gets to make l (optimal) guesses.
• Guesswork (Guessing Entropy).
, which is the expected number of tries of an (optimally guessing) adversary with unlimited number of allowed guesses before (and including) the correct one.
• Rényi Entropy. A parametric family (α ≥ 0, α = 1), defined as follows:
where P α denotes the α-norm of P . Shannon and Min-Entropy can be derived as special cases by letting α → 1 and α → ∞, respectively. Two other well-known members of this family are Collision entropy for α = 2:
, and Hartley entropy, for
It is straightforward to see the symmetry and expansibility of each of the above entropy measures. Regarding coreconcavity, note that for 1/l-Guess-Error-Probability, Guesswork and Shannon entropies, η can be simply taken as the identity function, η(x) = x, which is increasing. This is because for all of these entropies, H is itself concave. For Rényi family, we can either take η(
and F (P ) = P α . For both representations, if α ∈ [0, 1), η is increasing and F is concave, and if α > 1, η is decreasing and F is convex. Hence, in both cases, H is core-concave.
The posterior (conditional) entropy of the secret, sometimes also referred to as the equivocation, is denoted by
, where M is the random variable associated with the observed outputs, here, cloaks. H[θ|M ] should be a measure of the uncertainty of the adversary about the secret on average after observing the cloaks. The reduction in the uncertainty of the adversary about the secret after observing the cloak, i.e.,
, is the leakage of information (see, e.g. [7] ). Note that in our setting, the defender cannot choose or change the distribution of her secret, and therefore, irrespective of the choice of the entropy function, the prior entropy of the secret is unaffected by her cloaking strategy. Hence, the problem of minimizing information leakage becomes equivalent to maximizing the posterior entropy of the secret, i.e., solving:
Consider an arbitrary strategy of the defender δ, and let M + (δ) be the set of all cloaks that each has a nonzero probability of occurrence, i.e., M + (δ) = ∪ θ∈Θ supp(δ(θ)). These are labeled as the "on-path" cloaks. We will omit the argument δ whenever not ambiguous.
We assume that the conditional entropy for an entropy measure H(P ) = η(F (P )) has the following structure:
where Pr(M ), short for Pr(M = M ), is the probability that cloak M is observed by the adversary, and P (θ|M ) is the "posterior" distribution of the secrets given cloak M is observed, which is given by applying the Bayes' rule. Specifically,
Notice that we did not impose positivity of the entropy function H, as our results in fact do not rely on that. However, our assumed properties are sufficient to establish that the leakage, defined as
is always positive. Specifically, consider case (2a), for instance. Taking Pr(M ) to be the coefficients of a convex combination (as they are positive and add up to one), the concavity of F (or using Jensen's ineq.) gives:
The right side can be simplified to
, which is exactly the positivity of leakage.
Recall that for 1/l-Guess-Error Probability, Guesswork and Shannon entropy, η was just the identity function. Hence, for these entropies, (3) simply reduces to:
For Shannon entropy, the expression in (4) is exactly the classic conditional entropy. However, there is no commonly accepted definition of conditional entropy for other entropies. Nevertheless, the problem of maximizing the posterior entropy as defined in (4) have intuitive interpretations for a number of entropy measures that we introduced. Specifically, for the "1/l-Guess-Error-Probability", as we discuss in §V, this equivalently models a two-player zerosum game of incomplete information in which the defender faces a strategic adversary with knowledge of the prior who can make at most one (l) guess(es) after observing the cloak, gain one unit if (any of) his guess(es) is correct and zero otherwise. A game theoretic interpretation also exist for minimizing the leakage with respect to the "Guesswork" entropy, in the same spirit. In §V, besides showing these connections to zero-sum games, we also establish an interesting result: we provide a sufficient condition under which there is no pure strategy Nash Equilibrium of the corresponding games.
For Rényi entropies, the definition of conditional entropy as in (4), except for the limit case of α → 1, violates two desirable properties of "monotonicity" and "chain rule". Two commonly used alternative definitions that accommodate a set of desirable properties (ref. [28] , [29] ) are the following:
where, as before, · α denotes the α-norm. In particular, both of these definitions for α → ∞ yield the same representation for the conditional Min-Entropy:
. Both variants of conditional entropy for Rényi family comply with the general structure of (3). In particular, for the first expression for conditional Rényi entropy (5a), η(
and F (P ) = P α . Once again, recall that for α ∈ [0, 1), for both cases η is increasing and F is concave, and for α > 1, η is decreasing and F is convex.
As each entropy measure has its own distinct form and interpretation, it could have been the case that optimality of a cloaking scheme sensitively depend on the measure of entropy considered. However, in the next section, given P and k, we construct a cloaking strategy that is optimal with respect to any entropy measure that satisfies our generic assumptions, and hence, in that sense, is universally optimal. First, though, referring to the channel interpretation of cloaking strategies, we show that restriction of our analysis to cloaks does not affect the optimality among all similarly constrained channels.
Proposition 1: Consider the problem of designing a channel given a distribution P over the set of inputs (secrets) Θ with the constraint that the pre-image of each observable has to be limited to at most k elements. Then there is an optimal channel construction with respect to leakage in which no two observable have the same pre-image.
Proof: Consider any optimal channel C in which at least two observables, say y 1 and y 2 share the same preimage M ⊂ Θ. Now, consider an alternative channel constructed by merging y 2 into y 1 , i.e., for all θ ∈ M ,
Clearly, C new represents a valid channel (entries are still positive and rows add up to one). Moreover, C new leaks less information than C. The latter follows from a straightforward application of the following lemma (a generalization of the "data-processing" inequality for our generic entropies):
Lemma 1: Consider random variables X, Y , Z, and assume that given Y , Z is conditionally independent from X. Then for any entropy measure that satisfies our conditions, we have:
Proof of the lemma is provided in Appendix A. This proposition can be readily generalized to the general set-based cloaking constraints as well. Table I  LIST OF THE MAIN NOTATIONS. Parameter Definition Θ, n Set (, number) of possible secrets (n = |Θ|). d, δ A deterministic plan of action (pure strategy), and a randomized strategy of defender.
M(θ)
Set of permissible cloaks M for secret θ. M Set of all permissible cloaks:
The maximum allowed size of the cloaks.
III. ANALYSIS
In this section, we derive (in closed form) the maximum possible posterior entropy that can be achieved among all feasible randomized cloaking strategies for a given prior on the secrets P , a cloak size cap k, and a measure of entropy H (Theorem 1-A). Our result is "constructive", in that, in Algorithm 1, we explicitly provide a cloaking strategy that achieves this maximum posterior entropy (and hence, minimum leakage) for any symmetric, expansible, core-concave measure of entropy (Theorem 1-B) .
Before we present our formal result, let us get a feeling about the behavior of an optimal cloaking. Intuitively, the randomized strategy should try to induce posterior distributions over the secrets that are as close to uniform distribution over k elements as possible, since any welldefined measure of uncertainty increases as the distributions gets closer to uniform. The ideal case is that given any shown cloak, after the Bayesian update, the secret be equally likely any of the k members of the cloak. However, if the prior distribution is too "skewed" and the cap size of the cloaks is small, then this might not be feasible, as the secrets with too big prior probabilities will still have higher posteriors. If a prior probability of a secret is too big to be made uniform in the posterior, i.e., a "giant", then it should be instead maximally leveraged against to hide other secrets in its "shadow". So, intuitively, an optimal strategy should try to induce posteriors that are uniform over as many of the "small" probability secrets as possible and the "giants" should always be included in the cloaks to provide "coverage" for the small probability secrets.
In order to formally present our results, we need to introduce some auxiliary parameters. Given k and P = (p 1 , . . . , p n ), sorted in descending order, let index J be:
Note that for j = k, the condition
, which is trivially satisfied. Therefore, J is well-defined (i.e., can always be found), and we have 1 ≤ J ≤ k. Along the lines of the above intuitive discussion, the first J − 1 probabilities are the "giant" secrets. Next, for a j ∈ {1, . . . , k} and prior distribution P = (p 1 , . . . , p n ), let π j denote the probability distribution over k elements as the following:
In words, π j is a k-sized probability distribution that is constructed by keeping the top j − 1 probabilities of the prior as is, and then "wrapping" or "mashing" the remaining probabilities of the prior together and spreading them evenly over the remaining k − (j − 1) elements. Note that π 1 is simply the uniform distribution over the entire k elements. Finally, recall that we used M(θ) to denote the set of feasible cloaks for secret θ, which is composed of all the subsets of size at most k that include θ. Now, we introduce the notation M * (S), where S ⊆ Θ and |S| ≤ k, to denote the set of feasible cloaks that include all the elements of S and have size exactly equal to k, i.e., are maximally sized.
This notation is used in Step-2 of the Algorithm as well as in our proofs. For a simple example, suppose Θ = {1, 2, 3, 4} and k = 3, then M * ({1}) = {{1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 4}, {1, 3, 4}}, and M * ({1, 2}) = {{1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 4}}, and so on.
We are now ready to express our main result:
. . , p n ) be the prior (sorted in descending order), and let k be the maximum permissible size of the cloaks. Let index J and probability distributions π j be defined as in (6) and (7), respectively. Let the entropy be measured by the symmetric, expansible and "core-concave" function H. Then:
A. The maximum achievable posterior entropy among all (potentially randomized) cloaking strategies is H(π J ). B. Algorithm 1 explicitly provides a feasible (randomized) cloaking strategy that achieves the above maximum posterior entropy for any choice of the entropy, and hence, in this sense, is universally optimal.
Algorithm 1: Optimal Cloaking Strategy for a given P , k (Theorem 1)
by the solution of the linear system of equations in
Step 2), and the posterior distribution over the first J − 1 secrets is exactly their priors (guaranteed by steps 3 and 4). The gist of the proof of the theorem is provided in Appendix B. It follows simple logical steps but is nevertheless non-trivial.
In particular, first, we establish that H(π J ) is an upperbound for any feasible cloaking scheme. Subsequently, we show that Algorithm 1 provides a feasible cloaking strategy that achieves this upper-bound, and hence is optimal. A tricky step of the proof is to show that the linear system of equations in Step 2 indeed has a positive solution.
Here, we compute the optimal strategies for a few toy examples to gain some intuition about the algorithm. Consider the case of four possible secrets 1, 2, 3, 4 and k = 3. We have then the following possible size 3 cloaks:
Consider the following three possible priors over the secrets: P 1 = (0.3, 0.28, 0.22, 0.2), P 2 = (0.36, 0.3, 0.2, 0.14), P 3 = (0.4, 0.35, 0.15, 0.1). For P 1 , we have: P 1 (1) = 0.3 ≤ 1/k = 1/3 = 0.33, hence J = 1, and the optimal strategy will induce (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) posterior distributions. For P 2 , we have: P 2 (1) = 0.36 > 1/k but P 2 (2) = 0.3 ≤ (0.3 + 0.2 + 0.14)/(k − 1) = 0.64/2 = 0.32, therefore J = 2, and the optimal strategy will always include 1 in the cloak and induce (0.36, 0.32, 0.32) posterior distributions. For P 3 : P 3 (1) = 0.4 > 1/k, P 3 (2) = 0.35 > (0.35 + 0.15 + 0.1)/(k − 1) = 0.6/2 = 0.3, and only P 3 (3) = 0.15 ≤ (0.15+0.1)/(k−2) = 0.25/1 = 0.25, thus J = 3, and the optimal strategy will always include 1 and 2 in the cloak and induce (0.4, 0.35, 0.25) posteriors. Then the corresponding optimal cloaking strategies for P 1 , P 2 , P 3 respectively, as given by Algorithm 1 are the following: Recall from Bayes' rule that P (θ = θ|M ) := Pr(θ, M )/Pr(M ) = P (θ)δ(M ; θ)/Pr(M ). For instance, we can check that the optimal cloaking strategy for P 1 , irrespective of the shown cloak, induces uniform distribution over its 3 elements. Since the denominator is the same, we just need to verify P (θ)δ(M ; θ) is the same for all θ ∈ M . 
IV. DEPARTURE FROM SYMMETRIC ENTROPIES: EXTENSION TO GAIN-BASED MEASURES
In the previous section, we provided a probabilistic cloaking strategy that yields minimum leakage with respect to a large class of classical entropy measures. Our analysis only relied on structural properties of the entropy function, namely: symmetry, expansibility, and what we called "coreconcavity". A major point of departure from this family of entropies, where potentially all three of these properties can be violated, is the g-entropy introduced in [10] . g-entropy is a generalization of the notion of Min-Entropy by allowing secret/guess dependent gains to a guessing adversary. This notion of leakage has received attraction in the research community (e.g. [4] , [11] , [30] - [32] ). We will first overview the notion of g-entropy and g-leakage, then introduce our generalization of g-entropy by fusing it with Rényi entropies, and present an extension of our main theorem.
Recall that in the case of Min-Entropy, the entropy is related to the expected gain of an adversary that makes one optimal guess and wins one unit for every correct guess and zero otherwise, irrespective of the actual secret. Now consider instead that the adversary gains (and the defender loses) a reward of g(w, θ) ∈ [0, 1] units if the guess of the adversary and the actual secret are w ∈ W and θ ∈ Θ, respectively. The space of guesses W can be simply the same as the space of secrets Θ, or more complicated sets such as all permutations of the secrets for allowing a representation of the Guesswork entropy through the gain function. The gentropy is defined as the negative logarithm of the maximum expected reward of the adversary. Specifically, the (prior) gentropy of random variable θ with distribution P is:
Representing the gain function g by a matrix G ∈ R |W|×|Θ| , where G w,θ := g(w, θ), we can rewrite H g using the infinity-norm as follows:
The posterior g-entropy after observing output random variable M is defined as (see [10] ):
which, using the matrix representation G can be written as:
The difference between prior and posterior g-entropies is then defined as the g-leakage.
The matrix representation of the gain function makes it specially evident that the g-entropy is primarily an extension of the Min-Entropy, which corresponds to the case in which G is chosen to be the |Θ| × |Θ| identity matrix. However, as pointed out in [4] , l-guess and Guesswork entropies can also be recovered as special cases of g-entropy if the space of guesses W is respectively expanded to the set of all lsized subsets of Θ, and the set of all (n!) permutations of Θ, and the gain entries are selected appropriately. Specifically, for l-guess, g(w, θ) = 1 if θ ∈ w and 0 otherwise. For Guesswork, the gain values should be allowed to include negative numbers, specifically, g(w, θ) = −i, where i is the index (i.e., the position) of θ in the permutation w. However, it is not possible to capture Shannon entropy as a g-entropy with a g function with countable range. 13 Next, we introduce an extension of g-entropy that recaptures not only Shannon, but also all of the Rényi family as special cases.
Comparing the ∞-norm representation of the MinEntropy: − log P ∞ with that of the g-entropy: − log GP ∞ , and noting that Min-Entropy is a limit member of the Rényi entropies for α → ∞, we introduce an (α, g) family of entropies for α ≥ 0, α = 1, as follows:
where H α is just the usual Rényi entropy for parameter α. Moreover the conditional (α, g) entropy H α,g [θ|M ] , is also set to H α [θ|M ] according to one of the forms in (5a) or (5b) with P (θ|M ) replaced by GP (θ|M ). All Rényi entropies are trivially instances of (α, g) family by taking G to be the identity matrix. In particular, Shannon entropy is retrieved by also letting α → 1. The (α, g)-leakage can be defined as the difference between prior and posterior entropies. In particular, g-leakage defined in [10] is obtained from (α, g)-leakage by letting α → ∞. More generally, for a symmetric, expansible and coreconcave entropy function H(P ), it may be possible to define a corresponding gain-based entropy function as H g (P ) for a given gain function g with a matrix representation G, by replacing P with GP in its formulation, i.e., by taking H g (P ) := H(GP ), as long as GP is in the domain of the H function.
14 In particular, we consider a general family of entropies that can be expressed as H g (P ) = H(GP ) = η(F (GP )), and its conditional entropy can be written as:
where η and F satisfy (2a) or (2b). For instance, g-entropy [10] is retrieved by taking η(·) = − log(·) and
Recall that in our setting, since the defender is unable to affect the prior distribution of the secret, the problem of achieving minimum leakage becomes equivalent to maximizing the posterior entropy. Note that for almost any G other than the identity matrix, the new entropy function is no longer symmetric in P , and hence our main result does not directly apply here. However, for an important class of matrix gains, namely diagonal matrices, we present a generalization of Theorem 1. Specifically, for a given prior distribution P , diagonal gain matrix G, and the cloak size cap k, we provide a probabilistic cloaking strategy that is leakage-optimal with respect to any entropy that follows (9) . In particular, it is optimal for any choice of α in the (α, g)-family, and hence with respect to g-leakage as a special case.
We use the notation G = diag(γ) where γ = (γ 1 , . . . , γ n ) ∈ R +n , to indicate that G is a square diagonal matrix (zero for every entry except for possibly the diagonal elements). This models cases where the adversary gains γ i ≥ 0 if the secret is θ i and he identifies it correctly, and zero if he mis-identifies. Although investigating only diagonal gain matrices may be restrictive, they do exhibit the secret-dependent non-symmetric essence of the g-leakage notion. In §V, using a game theoretic approach, we describe an LP that yields optimal cloaking strategies for a general G (although only for α = ∞, i.e., g-leakage).
Theorem 2: Let P = (p 1 , . . . , p n ) be the prior, G = diag(γ), be the diagonal gain matrix, and let k be the size cap of the cloaks. Without loss of generality, assume that GP = (γ 1 p 1 , . . . , γ n p n ) is in descending order, i.e., (GP ) [i] = γ i p i . Let index J g and vector π g,j ∈ R +k be defined as follows:
, with conditional form as in (9), where η and F satisfy (2a) or (2b), which includes our (α, g)-entropies in (8) . Then: A. The maximum achievable posterior entropy
among all cloaking strategies is H(π g,Jg ). B. If sorted GP (in descending order) instead of P is passed to Algorithm 1 as its input argument, it explicitly provides a feasible (randomized) cloaking strategy that achieves the above maximum posterior entropy for any leakage measure of this family, in particular, g-leakage. An overview of the proof is provided in Appendix C.
The extension makes intuitive sense: The gain coefficients, γ i 's, represent the "relative importance" of having a secret revealed. The algorithm multiplies each probability by its corresponding gain and tries to make this "effective" importance of the secrets as equal as possible.
V. GAME THEORETIC ANALYSIS: EXTENSION TO GENERAL CONSTRAINTS AND GAIN MATRICES
In this section, we show how the designing of leakageoptimal channels with respect to g-entropies (including Min-Entropy, Guesswork and l-guess entropies as special cases) can be cast as 2-player zero-sum games (2PZSG in short) of incomplete information. This observation enables us to develop an LP that yields the minimum leakage and corresponding optimal strategies for a general gain matrix G and any cloaking constraints, beyond just the size-capped case that we investigated so far.
The setup should be now familiar: Consider an adversary that makes a guess w ∈ W after observing a cloak M . A deterministic plan of action for such an adversary, denoted by a, is hence a function from M to W, specifying his guess given each (permissible) cloak. Hence, the space of the adversary's pure strategies is A := W M , i.e., the set of all functions from M to W.
A randomized ("mixed") strategy of the adversary, designated by α, assigns a potentially probabilistic guess to each cloak, i.e., α : M → ΔW. Hence the space of randomized strategies of the adversary is simply A := (ΔW) M , i.e., the set of all functions from permissible cloaks to the probability distributions over guess choices. A pure and randomized strategy profile of the game are the pairs (d, a) ∈ (D × A) and (δ, α) ∈ (D × A ), respectively. Recall that we used the notation δ(M ; θ) to designate the probability at which, under the randomized strategy of δ, the defender chooses cloak M when her secret is θ. Likewise, α(w; M ) denotes the probability at which the adversary takes his guess to be w after observing M .
The outcome of each instance of the game is the following: the adversary wins (and the defender loses) g(w, θ) if adversary's guess and the (realization) of the secret had been w and θ respectively. The payoff of the game can in general be represented by the function v : Θ × M × W → R. In our game, in particular, we have v (θ, M, w) = g(w, θ) . The payoff of the defender is the negative of the adversary's.
Recall that we used M(θ) to denote the set of feasible cloaks that the defender can select for secret θ. In our game formulation, these cloaking constraints are allowed to be general, given explicitly as
Let V (P , M, δ, α), which we show by V for brevity, represent the expected payoff of the adversary (to be maximized by him, and minimized by the defender). The expectation is taken with respect to the random realization of the secret according to P as well as any randomization present in the strategies of the two players. Hence, in our problem:
As before, let M + be the set of cloaks that (under the defender's strategy δ) each has a strictly positive probability of being observed by the adversary, i.e., M + = ∪ θ∈Θ supp(δ(θ)). Since only these "on-path" cloaks contribute to the expected utilities, we have:
where: P δ (M ) := θ∈Θ P (θ)δ(M ; θ), i.e., the probability that M is observed by the adversary (which is nonzero for M ∈ M + ). We note that P (θ)δ(M ; θ)/P δ (M ) is the posterior probability that the secret is θ given that the observed cloak is M where the update in belief is done using the Bayes' rule. Let us denote the Bayesian update of the distribution of the secret given the observation of M by P B (·|M ), that is, P B (θ|M ) := P (θ)δ(M ; θ)/P δ (M ). Therefore, the expression for the expected payoff of the adversary can be written as:
Given a strategy of the defender δ, let the highest value of V achieved when the adversary adopts a best response strategy to δ be denoted by V , which depends on P , M and δ. From the above expression for V , any best response strategy of the adversary must select a maximizer of the conditional expectation of the gain given each "on-path" cloak, that is:
Using the matrix representation of the gain function and the notion of infinity norm, this can be written simply as
The value of V (P , M, δ) quantifies the worst expected loss of the defender given her randomized cloaking strategy δ. Let V * (P , M) denote its minimum across all feasible randomized cloaking strategies:
This is the minimax problem of the defender.
Recall the notion of g-entropy:
The connection should now be clear, that: finding the optimal (randomized) cloaking strategy that yields the least information leakage through cloaking (subject to cloaking constraints) with respect to g-leakage is equivalent to the minimax problem of the defender as stated in (11), where the defender, in a 2PZSG, faces a strategic adversary with knowledge of the prior, that makes guesses about the secret after observing the cloak, who gains g(w, θ) units if his guess is w and the actual secret is θ.
In any two-person game, a strategy pair is a (Nash) equilibrium if none of the players have any strictly advantageous unilateral deviation. In other words, keeping the strategy of the other player fixed, the strategy of each player must be a maximizer of its expected utility. Our first result shows that for an important class of cloaking constraints, deterministic strategy profiles never constitute a (Nash) equilibrium (except when the whole secret space is a permissible cloak for all secrets), and in particular, any equilibrium defense strategy (and thus, any optimal channel design) must involve randomization.
Suppose the cloaking constraints are such that ∀θ i , θ j ∈ Θ, we have: M(θ i ) ∩M(θ j ) = ∅. In words, any two secrets have at least one permissible cloak in common. We refer to this property as permissible connectivity. Note that the "sizecapped" cloak scenarios satisfy this property for any k ≥ 2.
Proposition 2: If the cloaking constraints satisfy "permissible connectivity" and the gain matrix is diagonal with positive entries, then except for the trivial case of Θ ∈ M(θ) ∀θ, there is no equilibrium among pure strategy profiles.
The proof is provided in Appendix D. Intuitively, if the adversary's strategy is deterministic, then even the "best" deterministic strategy of the defender can still be strictly improved by injecting ambiguity through randomization into it, as the adversary cannot "corner" the defender, thanks to the "permissible connectivity" condition.
The above result shows that the search for equilibria must be extended to randomized strategies. Existence of a solution among randomized strategy profiles is guaranteed by (an extension of) Nash's Theorem (or the "duality" in LPs).
Referring back to (11) , since for M ∈ M + we have P δ (M )P B (θ|M ) = P (θ)δ(M ; θ), the minimax problem of the defender can be simply re-written as:
Consider a defender's strategy δ * that achieves the above optimization, that is, δ * ∈ arg max δ∈D V (P , M, δ). Then by adopting strategy δ * , she can "guarantee" that her expected cost will never be above V * ( 
Specifically, a solution of the above LP denoted by x * = (x * θ M ) provides the equilibrium strategy of the defender through the transformation: w for all M ∈ M and w ∈ W, the adversary can "guarantee" that his expected reward will never fall below V * (P , M) irrespective of the cloaking strategy of the defender. Note that from strong duality of LPs, we have V * (P , M) = V * (P , M) which we denote by V * (P , M). This in part implies that (δ * , α * ) such found is indeed a randomized (Nash) equilibrium.
The above primal-dual LPs provides mutually optimal cloaking strategies of the defender and identification strategies of the adversary for any general cloaking constraints and G-matrix for the 2PZSG corresponding to g-leakage.
When the cloaking constraints are size-capped (to at most k), any of the strategies given in Theorem 2 is also a NE and a minimax strategy of the defender. Our game-theoretic formulation provides the optimal cloaking strategies for a general (non-diagonal) gain matrix in g-leakage and general cloaking constraints that include the size-capped model of Theorem 2. However, it requires solving a linear optimization as opposed to the much simpler problem of finding a positive solution for the linear system of equations in Theorem 2. Moreover, we showed that our strategies in Theorems 1 and 2 are optimal with respect to any measure of entropy that satisfies mild conditions. In contrast, the game-theoretic approach requires solving a new LP per each entropy. For instance, for "Guesswork" entropy, the action space of the adversary (his feasible guesses) is the set of all the permutations of secrets, and hence, the size of the linear program in our game theoretic model grows exponentially with the size of the secret space. Finally, unlike the LP formulation, Theorems 1 and 2 explicitly yield the value of the minimum achievable leakage.
Next, we provide the minimum achievable leakage in closed-form with respect to Min-Entropy. We establish this result in two ways: first, as a direct corollary of Theorem 1 to showcase the versatility of our main result, and next, through a game theoretic argument which provides intuition about the optimal strategies, and in particular, provides the optimal guessing strategies of the adversary as well.
Proposition 3: For a given prior P and cloak size-cap k, the maximum achievable posterior entropy w.r.t. MinEntropy is − log(max(1/k, P [1] )). This in turn implies that L ∞ (P , k), defined as the minimum achievable leakage with respect to Min-Entropy, is as follows: L ∞ (P , k) = 0 for any k ≥ 1/P [1] , and L ∞ (P , k) = − log(kP [1] ) for k < 1/P [1] .
Proof: From Theorem 1, if P [1] ≤ 1/k, then J = 1, which means the highest achievable posterior entropy is H(π 1 ) = H ((1/k, . . . , 1/k)). For Min-Entropy, this gives − log(1/k). If on the other hand P [1] > 1/k, then J is an index between 2 and k. For any J > 1, the largest element of π J is P [1] , hence H(π J ) for Min-Entropy is equal to − log(P [1] ). Putting these together yields the claim. And now, an alternative proof based on game theory:
Proof: In the 2PZSG corresponding to Min-Entropy, consider the following strategy of the adversary, which we refer to as α 1 : always guess θ 1 for any observed M that includes θ 1 , and make a uniformly random guess from M if it does not. 15 We argue that this strategy "guarantees" an expected reward of p 1 for the adversary, irrespective of the strategy of the defender. This simply follows by conditioning on the realization of the secret: with probability p 1 , the secret is θ 1 . For such cases, the adversary will always guess correctly and gains one unit since any permissible cloak for θ 1 includes it as well. Now, consider this alternative strategy of the adversary, denoted by α 2 : For 15 Formally, for all M : θ 1 ∈ M , take α 1 (θ 1 ; M ) = 1 and α 1 (θ; M ) = 0 ∀θ = θ 1 , and for all M :
any observed M , choose a uniformly random guess from it. 16 This strategy "guarantees" the adversary an expected reward of 1/k irrespective of the defender's strategy. This is because, the expected reward of the adversary that follows this strategy is
Note in particular, that the specific posterior distributions do not play a role.
The adversary can guarantee an expected reward of p 1 and 1/k by employing the simple strategies α 1 and α 2 respectively. Hence, he can also guarantee the better of the two, i.e., max(1/k, p 1 ), just by comparing p 1 and 1/k and employing the corresponding strategy. He may even be able to do better by perhaps employing more intelligent strategies. However, the defender can also guarantee that, irrespective of the strategy of the adversary, his gain never exceeds max(1/k, p 1 ) by adopting the strategies prescribed by Algorithm 1. In particular, if p 1 ≤ 1/k, then the defender has a feasible strategy that induces uniform posterior distribution for any chosen cloak. Hence, irrespective of the guessing strategy of the adversary, his gain is going to be 1/k. On the other hand, if p 1 > 1/k, then the defender has a feasible strategy that for any chosen cloak induces posterior distribution with its maximum value on θ 1 (so in part, for any realization of the secret, θ 1 is also picked as part of the cloak). This guarantees that irrespective of the strategy of the adversary, his gain is bounded by p 1 .
Proposition 3 may come as a bit of surprise: if P [1] > 1/k, the information leakage with respect to Min-Entropy can be made absolutely zero. This can in fact be generalized to l-Guess-Entropy too:
, then the minimum leakage with respect to l-Guess-Entropy is zero. These results however do not contradict the Shannon's perfect secrecy, since, unlike Shannon's entropy, MinEntropy and l-Guess-Entropy do not retain the information of the whole distribution. Also note that these zero-leakage cases correspond to priors that are highly skewed. In such cases, figuratively speaking, the "giants" cannot be helped, but the secrets with small probabilities can "hide in the shadow of the giants". In other words, the prior already is very revealing and gives a lot of advantage to the adversary, but the defender can at least leverage those high probability secrets to not reveal any extra information to the adversary.
Extensions of Proposition 3 to the l-Guess and Guesswork follow next, which again can be seen as direct corollaries of Theorem 1 or established using game theoretic arguments.
Proposition 4: In the 2PZSG corresponding to the lGuess-Error-Probability entropy, the maximum expected reward of the adversary is the following:
Proposition 5: In the 2PZSG corresponding to the Guesswork entropy, the minimum expected cost of the adversary (expected number of guesses before detection) is:
VI. NUMERICAL ILLUSTRATIONS First, we investigate the effect of the maximum permissible cloak size, k, and the choice of the entropy measures on the minimum achievable leakage. We consider three candidate entropy measures: Shannon, Guesswork, and MinEntropy. Recall that: H Sh. (θ) := − n i=1 p i log(p i ) and its conditional entropy follows the form of (4). For MinEntropy, H ∞ (θ) := − log max θ (P (θ)), and conditional entropy takes the form of (9) (a case of (2b)), that is,
iP [i] and the posterior entropy follows the prescription of (4). However, to obtain a comparable scale for all three, we added a log to both prior and posterior of Guesswork entropy (hence, a case of (2a)).
For all examples in this section, we consider a secret space consisting of 30 elements with the following prior distribution: P = (30/465, 29/465, . . . , 1/465). Fig. 1a shows that, as we expect, the minimum leakage reduces as larger cloaks are allowed. When leakage is quantified with Shannon entropy, min-leakage only vanishes when k = n, in accordance with the classic "perfect secrecy" result. However, the minimum achievable information leakage with respect to Min-Entropy becomes zero for any k ≥ 16 in our example. This is in accordance with the result of Proposition 3, which stated that for any k ≥ 1/P [1] , an optimal cloaking strategy can achieve zero leakage with respect to Min-Entropy. In this example, 1/P [1] = 465/30 = 16.
Next, we compare the performance of an optimal strategy against the following base-line strategy: for any given secrets pick a feasible cloak uniformly randomly. Note that this strategy is in fact optimal when the prior distribution is uniform, but not necessarily for other priors. Fig. 1b depicts the leakage with respect to Min-Entropy achieved by the optimal strategy and the base-line strategy when P = (30/465, . . . , 1/465), demonstrating the sub-optimality of the base-line for any intermediate value of k. Adoption of this strategy is sub-optimal because it essentially ignores the fact that an adversary who has learned the distribution of the secret can exploit it to further improve his guessing power.
Next, we investigate the effect of one of the assumptions we made in the paper: that the defender designs her cloaking strategy assuming that the adversary knows the true distribution of the secrets. In particular, we consider an "uninformed" adversary, that does not know the prior distribution, and thus, for any observed cloak simply chooses a guess uniformly randomly. What will be the performance of the strategy that is designed to be optimal with the worstcase assumption that the adversary is "informed" of the true distribution, but facing an uninformed adversary. In Fig. 1c , for the prior of P = (30/465, . . . , 1/465), we have depicted the posterior Min-Entropy for an "informed" vs. "ignorant" adversary. As we can see, for k ≥ 16, the Min-Entropy of the ignorant adversary is larger than that of the informed one. For k < 16, we have P [1] < 1/k, which implies J = 1, and hence, the optimal cloaking strategy indeed induces uniform posterior distributions on any chosen cloak. Hence, uniformly random guessing from any observed cloak by the "uninformed" adversary is exactly optimal.
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VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We investigated the fundamental properties of leakage when perfect secrecy is not achievable due to the limit on the allowable size of the conflating sets. We have shown the existence of universally optimal strategies achieving minimum leakage for any measure of entropy that satisfy a mild set of conditions (symmetry, expansibility, and what we called "core-concavity") and extended it to g-leakage entropies where these conditions may fail for diagonal gain matrices. We also demonstrated how the problem of minimum leakage channel design is equivalent to Nash equilibria in a corresponding two person zero-sum games of incomplete information for a range of entropy measures.
There are several possible directions to explore for future research. For instance, our theorems give rise to the next fundamental question: for what other types of constraints can we construct universally optimal channels? We expect that the techniques developed in our proofs be reused specially in unification of different notions of leakage and establishing robustness results. Another interesting direction of research is relaxing the i.i.d. assumption of the realization of the secrets and allowing correlation over time, where an adversary can learn more than just the distribution by observing the history. Designing optimal strategies for such a case is among our next research goals. Negative of the log of the expected reward of an "informed" adversary, who knows the true prior distribution of the secret, and an "uninformed" adversary who simply assumes a uniform prior. The channel (randomized strategies) is designed to be optimal assuming facing an informed adversary. step 3. Hence, for any l < k: one of the p J 's, we get the equivalent inequality that p J−1 > n i=J p i /(k − J + 1). This is exactly the condition for Part (II) of Lemma 2. Hence, our randomized cloaking strategy achieves the upper-bound of H(π J ). This concludes the proof of Lemma 3, and thus, of the theorem.
